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Privacy practices for ZEC trades

Zcash launched in 2016 as the first deployment of zk-SNARK-based shielded transactions in a cryptocurrency. The chain supports two address families: transparent (t1/t3) which behave like Bitcoin's legacy addresses with publicly visible amounts, and shielded (zs1 Sapling, u1 Unified Address bundling Orchard receivers) which use zero-knowledge proofs to hide sender, recipient, and amount on chain. Per-trade, the recipient picks the address type that matches their preferred posture. Both are first-class on the protocol.

Use a fresh address every trade

This chain uses transparent addresses with no native stealth. The standard practice: use a Hierarchical Deterministic (BIP-32) wallet that derives a new receive address per request. Most modern wallets do this automatically. The cost of address reuse is severe — every trade you accept at the same address builds a public record of your activity.

Opt-in privacy technologies

Standards that wallets in this ecosystem may implement. Vigilante Trading does NOT recommend specific wallet software — even reputable wallets have been compromised. Search for a wallet that supports these standards and review its trust posture yourself.

  • Shielded pools (Sapling + Orchard)

    Zcash's protocol-level privacy. Shielded transactions (zs1 Sapling, u1 Unified Address) use zero-knowledge proofs (zk-SNARKs) to hide sender, recipient, and amount on chain. Sapling is the established shielded pool (since 2018); Orchard is the newer pool (Network Upgrade 5, 2022) accessed through Unified Addresses. Per-address — recipients pick z/u-addr for shielded transactions or t-addr for transparent. Both transparent and shielded are first-class on the protocol. Wallets that fully support shielded sends: Zashi (mobile, official from Electric Coin Co, Sapling + Orchard), Zecwallet (desktop, Sapling), Nighthawk Wallet (mobile, Sapling). Older wallets may only support transparent (t-addr) sends, so confirm your counterparty's wallet supports the address type you intend to use.

Universal practices

**Use a fresh receive address for every trade.** Your wallet should support this; if it doesn't, look for one that does. Address reuse is the single biggest leak.

**Practice coin control when spending.** When sending coins later, avoid combining the trade output with coins from another source — that combines their address histories permanently.

**Broadcast through Tor or your wallet's privacy mode.** Your home IP address sees the transaction first; nodes near your IP can correlate it to you. A Tor-aware wallet broadcasts through Tor by default.

**Avoid sending trade coins to or from KYC exchanges.** Once trade coins touch a KYC exchange, the trade becomes legally identifiable by combining exchange records with chain data. If you need to bridge to fiat, route through a self-custodied intermediate step.

What to avoid

  • Do not paste your same receive address into multiple trades.
  • Do not send the exact amount listed on the order — Vigilante Trading's amount-randomizer toggle (the "🔐 Randomize amount" checkbox in the address-share modal) breaks this; leave it ON.
  • Do not combine the trade output with coins from a different source when you later spend it.
  • Do not broadcast from your home IP via a non-private wallet — use Tor.

⚠ Caveats specific to this asset

Shielded-to-shielded transactions hide sender, recipient, and amount on chain. Mixed transactions (shielded-to-transparent or transparent-to-shielded) reveal one side. Transparent-to-transparent reveals both. If your goal is to minimize linkability, use a shielded address (zs1 or u1) and ask the counterparty to send from a shielded address. Wallet support varies: Zashi (mobile, official from Electric Coin Co, Sapling + Orchard), Zecwallet (desktop, Sapling), Nighthawk (mobile, Sapling) — not every wallet supports every address type, so verify your counterparty's wallet handles the address type you publish before sharing it.

Vigilante Trading does NOT recommend specific wallet software. Even reputable wallets have been compromised or have had hidden flaws. The privacy techniques here are protocol standards, not endorsements — your wallet, your responsibility.